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	 My	 talk	 today	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 subjective	 reflections	 on	 forty-plus	 years	 in	 the	
field	 of	China	 studies	 in	North	America	 and	more	 objective	 assessments	 of	 the	 course	
the	 field	 has	 taken	 over	 this	 period	 of	 time.	 I	 should	 stress	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	
views	expressed	here	are	solely	my	own;	 they	are	not	posing	as	objective	truth.
	 I	first	became	interested	in	East	Asian	studies	in	my	second	year	of	college	in	1970,	
forty-one	 years	 ago,	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Chicago.	 It	 was	 an	 extremely	 heady	 time	 in	
China	 with	 news	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 appearing	 regularly	 in	 the	 newspapers,	
though	 the	 stories	 were	 based	 on	 little	 or	 no	 firsthand	 information	 available.	 In	 my	
sophomore	year,	 I	enrolled	 in	a	graduate	course	on	contemporary	China	 taught	by	 the	
late	 Tsou	 Tang	（Zou	 Dang）.	 Professor	 Tsou	was	 the	 son	 of	 Tsou	 Lu,	 a	 high-ranking	
Guomindang	 official	 and	 historian	 noted	 for	 his	 anti-Communist	 profile.	 Tsou	 Tang,	
however,	 had	 written	 highly	 critical	 things	 about	 Chiang	 Kai-shek	 and	 was	 thus	 no	
friend	of	Taiwan.	His	 interpretation	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	was	basically	no	different	
from	what	 one	 could	 read	 in	 the	People’s Daily	（Renmin ribao）,	 although	 he	 couched	
his	views	 in	political	 science	 terminology.	Most	of	us	 in	his	course	believed	everything	
he	said.	The	next	year,	another	University	of	Chicago	professor	of	Chinese	heritage,	Ho	
Ping-ti	（He	 Bingdi）	 was	 able	 to	 visit	 China,	 and	 he	 brought	 back	 heroic	 tales	 that	
would	have	even	made	Lei	Feng	blush.	Both	Tsou	and	Ho	were	first-rate	scholars	and	
native	speakers	of	Chinese,	I	thought	to	myself,	but	nothing	could	be	as	fabulous	as	the	
stories	they	told.
	 In	 1971	 I	wrote	 the	American	State	Department	 and	 asked	 about	 travel	 to	China	
for	 U.S.	 citizens.	 I	 received	 a	 letter	 back	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 only	 impediment	 to	
visiting	 China	 was	 the	 Chinese	 government’s	 unwillingness	 to	 allow	 us	 in.	 I	 had	 my	
doubts,	but	 I	was	 in	no	position	 to	do	anything	about	 it.	 In	1972	 I	graduated	 from	the	
 ＊	Canada	Research	Chair,	Professor	of	History,	York	University,	Canada
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University	of	Chicago,	and	I	entered	graduate	school	at	Columbia	University	 in	the	fall.	
There	had	been	the	totally	bizarre	Lin	Biao	affair	 in	1971,	and	already	show	trials	were	
beginning	 with	 members	 of	 the	 Chinese	 military	 allegedly	 making	 an	 assortment	 of	
denials	 and	 admissions.	 Again	 the	 news	 was	 heavily	 filtered,	 and	 no	 trustworthy	
Western	press	were	allowed	 in.	This	time,	 I	didn’t	believe	a	word	of	 it,	and	slowly	but	
surely	I	found	myself	 increasingly	interested	more	in	modern	Chinese	history	than	I	was	
in	the	history	of	 the	Chinese	Communist	revolution.
	 Columbia	had	a	 strict	 language	 requirement	 for	 those	 of	 us	doing	Chinese	history
—something	which	 it	 no	 longer	 has—and	 it	 involved	 roughly	 four	 years	（or	more）	 of	
Japanese	 language	training.	The	more	Japanese	I	 learned,	the	more	 interested	I	became	
in	 modern	 Japan.	 Then,	 when	 it	 was	 time	 to	 pick	 a	 topic	 for	 my	 doctoral	 thesis,	 I	
wanted	to	be	able	to	use	the	Japanese	I	had	spent	so	many	hours	studying.	In	addition,	
China	was	still	off	 limits	to	Americans	by	the	mid-1970s,	but	there	was	always	Japan.	I	
spent	about	eighteen	months	at	Kyoto	University,	doing	 research	on	Naitō	Konan;	 this	
was	a	time	when	there	were	basically	Naitō’s	 last	students—all	retired	and	quite	old	at	
the	 time—and	 the	 anti-Naitō	 people	mostly	 from	Tokyo	who	 saw	 signs	 of	 imperialism	
in	everything	he	had	ever	written.	That	situation	has	now	completely	changed,	 in	part	
because	of	 the	ongoing	work	of	Professor	Tanigawa	Michio	and	 in	part	because	of	 the	
newfound	 interest	 in	Naitō	 among	Chinese	 students.	 Several	days	after	 our	 conference	
here	concludes,	Professor	Tao	Demin	will	convene	a	workshop	on	Naitō	with	a	group	of	
mostly	Chinese	scholars—and	I	am	very	excited	to	be	a	part	of	 it.
	 I	 later	went	on	to	teach	at	Harvard	University	 in	the	1980s,	and	then	from	1989	at	
the	University	of	California,	Santa	Barbara	until	 2005	when	 I	moved	 to	Canada.	 I	 thus	
first	 became	 involved	 in	 China	 studies	 when	 the	 Cold	War	 was	 calming	 down	 and	 a	
leftist	reaction	was	forming	to	 it,	but	I	quickly	saw	that	politics	and	scholarship	were	a	
volatile	mixture	that	needed	to	be	avoided	personally	as	much	as	possible,	 if	 in	scholar-
ship	 it	 might	 make	 for	 an	 interesting	 approach.	 I	 think	 it	 must	 be	 my	 nichao	 逆潮	
nature	but	I	have	never	fully	trusted	people	 in	authority,	and	 just	as	I	came	quickly	to	
disbelieve	my	professors	at	the	University	of	Chicago,	I	never	fully	saw	eye-to-eye	with	
my	 thesis	 advisor	 at	 Columbia	 although	 he	 was	 at	 the	 far	 other	 end	 of	 the	 political	
spectrum.
	 The	 main	 topic	 of	 my	 talk	 today	 will	 be	 a	 preliminary	 investigation	 of	 how	 the	
advent	of	the	Cold	War	affected	the	development	of	China	studies	 in	the	United	States.	
Although	I	now	live	and	teach	 in	Canada,	as	I	have	mentioned,	 I	am	an	American	and	
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have	been	a	part	of	the	world	of	Chinese	studies	 in	American	for	over	forty	years	now.	
Now	that	 the	Cold	War	has	been	over	 for	more	 than	 two	decades,	we	are	only	begin-
ning	 to	 understand	many	 things	 that	were	 at	 best	 hazy	 or	 even	 obscured	 during	 the	
period	when	the	Cold	War	was	at	 its	height.	As	Su	Dongpo	put	 it	so	well,	「不識廬山真
面目，	只緣身在此山中」,	or	as	we	say	（in	a	much	 less	poetic	way）	in	English,	we	couldn’t	
tell	 the	 forest	 from	 the	 trees	（「山にいて、山を見ず」）.	 Hopefully,	 twenty	 or	 fifty	 years	
from	now,	 it	will	be	even	clearer	 for	scholars.
	 America	emerged	from	World	War	Two	not	only	as	one	of	the	victors,	but	as	the	
only	 victor	 that	 had	never	 been	 a	 field	 of	 battle.	Great	Britain,	France,	Russia,	 and,	 of	
course,	 China	 were	 also	 on	 the	 victorious	 side,	 but	 they	 had	 all	 sustained	 terrible	
damage	and,	particularly	 in	the	cases	of	Russia	and	China,	a	huge	number	of	deaths.	 It	
would	 take	 years	 to	 rebuild.	 In	 addition,	 the	 political	 situation	 in	 China	 was	 still	
unstable,	and	a	renewed	civil	war	would	soon	erupt	causing	more	destruction	and	 loss	
of	 life	 before	 the	 Communists	 came	 to	 power	 in	 1949.	 Thus,	where	 other	Allies	were	
picking	 up	 the	 pieces	 after	August	 1945,	 the	United	 States	 found	 itself	 invigorated	 by	
the	war.	Whole	 new	 industries	were	 fostered	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	war	 effort,	 the	 Great	
Depression	 was	 finally	 over,	 and	 an	 entire	 generation	 of	 young	 men	 and	 women	
returned	 home	 and	 packed	 the	 universities	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 secure	 a	 better	 place	 for	
themselves	 and	 their	 families	 than	 their	 parents’	 generation	 had	 enjoyed.	 One	 might	
easily	 argue	 that	wartime	experiences	gave	many	of	 that	generation	（recently	dubbed	
the	 “greatest	 generation”）	 a	 new	 perspective	 of	 a	 wider	 world	 in	 which	 they	 might	
amount	to	something.
	 As	the	U.S.	government	 frequently—all	 too	 frequently—learned	too	 late	during	the	
war,	 it	 had	 far	 too	 few	 experts	 at	 home	 for	 dealing	 with	 a	 previously	 unknown	
wartime	enemy.	The	number	of	Americans	who	knew	Japanese	and	could	thus	analyze	
intercepted	documents	 or	monitor	 radio	 signals	was	 appallingly	 small.	There	was	 as	 a	
result	an	 intensive	program	during	the	war	to	train	a	group	of	men	with	these	aims	 in	
mind,	 and	 they	 usually	 came	 from	 educated	 sectors	 of	 the	 population.	 This	 group	
included	 many	 who	 would	 after	 the	 war	 move	 into	 China	 studies,	 such	 as	 Benjamin	
Schwartz	 who	 taught	 his	 entire	 career	 at	 Harvard	 University,	 Joseph	 Levenson	 who	
taught	 his	 entire	 career	 at	 the	 University	 of	 California,	 Berkeley,	 and	 among	 my	
teachers,	Wm.	Theodore	 de	Bary	 and	 John	Meskill,	 both	 of	whom	 taught	 at	Columbia	
University	 during	 their	 careers.	 In	 this	 restricted	 sense,	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	 effects	 of	
the	 war	 was	 its	 positive	 influence	 on	 China	 studies.	Without	 the	 experience	 of	 inten-
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sively	 studying	 Japanese,	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	Schwartz,	Levenson,	 or	Meskill	（and	many	
others）	would	have	ended	up	 in	East	Asian	studies.
	 Other	 Americans	 who	 had	 had	 significant	 exposure	 to	 Chinese	 language	 training	
before	 the	 war—or	 seemed	 ready,	 willing,	 and	 able	 to	 acquire	 it	 during	 the	 war—
served	 in	 the	 O.S.S.	（Office	 of	 Strategic	 Services）,	 the	 forerunner	 of	 the	 Central	
Intelligence	 Agency.	 This	 group	 would	 include	 John	 King	 Fairbank	 who	 had	 studied	
Chinese	 prior	 to	 the	war	 and	would	 spend	 his	 entire	 career	 at	Harvard,	 and	my	 first	
professor	 of	 Chinese	 history,	 C.	Martin	Wilbur,	who	was	 born	 and	 raised	 in	 Shanghai,	
the	son	of	a	YMCA	employee	there.
	 Having	 all	 these	wonderfully	 gifted	young	men	and	women	 return	home	 ready	 to	
take	 up	 university	 positions	 or	 enter	 graduate	 programs	 in	 China	 studies	would	 have	
meant	 nothing	 if	 the	 United	 States	 government	 did	 not	 play	 its	 part.	 The	 postwar	
economic	 boom	 in	 the	 U.S.	 and	 learning	 the	 lesson	 of	 unpreparedness	 from	 the	 war	
years	 led	 to	 a	 large	 investment	 by	 the	 national	 government	 in	 education	 for	 Asian	
studies.	This	 became	 a	mission	 once	 it	was	 clear	 that	 the	Communists	were	 going	 to	
win	the	civil	war	and	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	 failing	regime	fled	to	Taiwan	 in	the	 late	1940s.	
And,	 for	 several	 decades,	 China	 studies	 boomed	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Positions	 were	
added	 to	universities,	 students	were	 supported	by	 the	 federal	 government	 in	 graduate	
school,	 often	 through	 grants	 from	 the	Department	 of	Defense,	 and	 a	 small	 golden	 age	
ensued.	Although	 initially	 founded	 in	1941,	 the	Association	for	Asian	Studies	 found	new	
life	after	the	war,	and	 its	 journal,	The Far Eastern Quarterly	changed	 its	name	 in	1956	
to	the	present	title,	Journal of Asian Studies.
	 The	war	and	America’s	embrace	of	China	during	 it	brought	China	 into	 the	homes	
of	 many	 more	 Americans	 than	 previously.	 There	 had	 been	 a	 small	 number	 of	
Americans	whose	missionary	 families	brought	 them	to	China	before	 the	war	started—
of	whom	Pearl	Buck	 is	probably	most	 famous—but	during	the	war,	 the	plight	of	China	
appeared	 in	 the	 newspaper	 almost	 every	 day.	 It	 helped	 that	 Soong	 Mei-ling,	 wife	 of	
Chiang	Kai-shek,	was	a	fluent	speaker	of	English	and	graduate	of	Wellesley	College	and	
made	 frequent	 appeals	 for	 help	 to	 the	 American	 public.	 Though	 hardly	 a	 friend	 of	
democracy,	 she	 and	her	 husband	were	widely	 known	 to	 the	 generation	 coming	 of	 age	
in	the	 immediate	postwar	years.
	 In	addition,	 in	 the	early	postwar	years,	 the	United	States	unlike	 its	earlier	history	
was	 friendly	to	 immigration	 from	China	and	Taiwan,	especially	of	 those	seeking	higher	
education.	Many	Chinese—as	 is	now	the	case,	with	all	 the	obvious	differences—came	to	
The	Cold	War	and	China	Studies	 in	the	United	States	（Fogel） 7
the	 United	 States	 from	 the	 late	 1940s	 through	 the	 1960s.	 The	 majority	 came	 from	
Taiwan	 or	 from	 the	Mainland	via	Taiwan,	 because	China	 soon	 shut	 its	 doors,	 refusing	
to	permit	the	“brain	drain,”	as	 it	came	to	be	known,	 from	seriously	eroding	the	stock	of	
highly	 educated	 men	 and	 women	 in	 all	 fields	 across	 the	 boards.	 Many	 of	 those	 who	
came	 to	 the	U.S.	 from	China	 or	Taiwan	 decided	 to	 stay	 on	 after	 graduation	 and	 took	
positions	 at	 American	 universities.	 And,	 as	 a	 result,	 many	 fine	 teachers	 of	 Chinese	
history	and	culture—amid	a	wider	pool	of	Chinese	 in	all	fields	of	 learning—remained	 in	
America	for	their	entire	careers.	I	myself	have	been	fortunate	enough	to	study	or	work	
with	 many	 such	 professors.	 The	 chancellor	 of	 the	 university	 I	 used	 to	 teach	 at,	 the	
University	 of	 California,	 Santa	 Barbara,	 was	 a	 scientist	 from	 Taiwan	 and	 before	 that	
originally	an	émigré	 from	China	to	Taiwan.
	 In	short,	 then,	the	postwar	period	began	a	boom	era	 in	China	studies	 in	the	United	
States.	 After	 1949,	 it	 was	 fueled	 by	 the	 government’s	 desire	 to	 “Know	Your	 Enemy.”	
Very	few	scholars	who	benefited	from	their	government’s	 largesse	actually	bought	 into	
the	anti-Communist	policies	of	the	United	States,	but	most	were	only	too	willing	to	take	
advantage	 of	 the	 money	 made	 available	 for	 research	 on	 China.	 There	 were	 a	 few	
scholars	 who	 remained	 openly	 and	 acerbically	 anti-Communist,	 but	 politics	 would	 not	
intrude	for	many	for	a	 long	time.
	 However,	 it	was	not	that	simple.	Before	the	war,	China	studies	exited	in	the	United	
States	but	 it	was	much,	much	 less	developed	than	 it	became	after	the	war.	Britain	and	
France	had	far	more	developed	traditions	of	Sinology	than	the	United	States,	and	what	
existed	 in	the	U.S.	was	mostly	directed	at	traditional	Chinese	history	and	culture.	In	the	
postwar	 period,	 the	 social	 sciences	 exploded	 in	 popularity—and	 in	 part	 because	 the	
kinds	 of	 information	 that	 social	 scientists	 derived	 from	 their	 studies	 was	 what	 the	
government	needed	during	the	Cold	War	and	sought	to	 fund.	Even	those	scholars,	who	
would	otherwise	have	shown	no	 inclination	to	take	an	anti-Communist	stand	during	the	
Cold	War,	came	to	the	realization	that	 the	revolutionary	currents	of	 the	China	of	 their	
own	times	had	been	woefully	underestimated.	They	had	all	read	about	Mao	Zedong	and	
his	colleagues	 in	Yan’an	 in	Edgar	Snow’s	Red Star over China,	but	only	those	motivated	
more	by	wishful	 ideological	 thinking	 than	by	 scholarly	 investigation	were	prepared	 for	
a	Communist	victory	by	the	 late	1940s.
	 Many	scholars	felt	that	somehow	they	had	gotten	China	terribly	wrong.	Those	who	
had	been	studying	China	or	 just	observing	the	mass	poverty,	corruption,	and	then	war	
and	 civil	war	 thought	 that	China	was	 a	 gigantic	mess,	 very	 sad	 to	 be	 sure,	 but	mori-
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bund.	Then,	right	 from	the	heart	of	 the	giant	came	this	massive	movement	of	renewal	
in	the	 form	of	a	Communist	movement	which	had	conveniently	toned	down	its	sharply	
leftist	 bent	 during	 the	 war	 years	 and	 its	 collaboration	 with	 Chiang	 Kai-shek’s	
Guomindang.	 Many	 scholars	 and	 budding	 scholars	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 even	 if	 they	
were	not	themselves	 leftists,	were	exhilarated	when	China,	 in	the	 famous	words	of	 the	
time,	 “stood	 up.”	 They	 may	 not	 necessarily	 have	 been	 pleased	 with	 Communism,	 but	
they	 felt	 that	 some	 system	 of	 political	 and	 social	 organization	 that	would	 bring	 order,	
peace,	and	a	modicum	of	sustenance	to	the	masses	of	the	 impoverished	Chinese	people	
might	 work	 in	 China	 in	 a	 way	 that	 they	would	 never	 have	 agreed	 to	 try	 and	 imple-
ment	 for	themselves.	Professor	Fairbank	makes	a	similar	point	 in	his	memoirs.
	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 these	 momentous	 events,	 some	 scholars	 who	 had	 been	 active	 as	
scholars	even	before	 the	war	 in	more	 traditional	fields	switched	to	studying	twentieth-
century	 or	 contemporary	 China.	 My	 own	 first	 advisor	 in	 graduate	 school,	 C.	 Martin	
Wilbur,	 is	a	perfect	case	 in	point.	He	had	written	and	published	 in	doctoral	dissertation	
on	 slavery	 in	 the	Former	Han	dynasty,	 and	 then	 after	 the	war	worked	 exclusively	 on	
the	Nationalist	revolution,	Sun	Yat-sen,	Chiang	Kai-shek,	and	political	and	military	advi-
sors	 to	 the	Guomindang	and	Communists	sent	by	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Comintern.	
It	was	not	that	he	felt	 that	premodern	China	was	uninteresting	or	unimportant,	but	he	
did	clearly	feel	that	the	revolutionary	movements	of	his	own	lifetime	 in	China	had	been	
underestimated	 in	 influence	 and	 significance.	 He	 also	 was	 largely	 responsible	 for	
building	Columbia	University’s	East	Asian	Institute,	one	of	 the	earliest	 interdisciplinary	
institutes	 for	studying	contemporary	China	 in	the	United	States.
	 His	 change	 of	 focus	 reflected	 the	 similar	 interest	 of	 the	 postwar	U.S.	 government	
in	understanding	contemporary	China	that	I	mentioned	earlier.	Money	was	being	made	
available	for	scholars	not	to	study	topics	 like	slavery	 in	the	Former	Han,	but	contempo-
rary	 China	 and	 especially	 the	 revolutionary	movements	 that	 had	 landed	 China	 in	 the	
position	 it	 was	 now	 in.	 Many	 scholars	 would	 continue	 to	 couch	 their	 applications	 for	
funding	 in	 such	 a	way	 as	 to	 address	 contemporary	China,	 even	 if	 they	 had	 no	 partic-
ular	 interest	 scholarly	 or	 otherwise	 in	 contemporary	 China,	 but	 the	 more	 important	
change	was	that	China	studies	 in	the	social	sciences	began	to	blossom	at	this	time.	The	
fields	 of	 sociology,	 anthropology,	 economics,	 and	 political	 science	 all	 began	 to	 provide	
places	 for	the	study	of	China	throughout	the	United	States.
	 One	 of	 the	more	 fascinating	 aspects	 of	 this	 development	was	 that	 until	 the	 1980s	
no	 serious	 American	 scholar	 was	 allowed	 into	 China,	 much	 less	 to	 do	 field	 research.	
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The	 social	 sciences	 are	 predicated	 on	 the	 intensive	 field	 work,	 observing	 and	 inter-
viewing	contemporary	subjects,	and	then	returning	to	test	out	theories	developed	in	the	
office.	 The	 best	 that	 American	 social	 scientists	 working	 on	 China	 in	 the	 1950s-1970s	
could	do	was	to	 interview	refugees	 in	Hong	Kong.	The	interview	process	 in	Hong	Kong	
became	 something	 of	 a	 small	 industry	 there,	 and	 of	 course	 the	 interviewees	were	 not	
the	 best	 suppliers	 of	 unbiased	 data	 on	 China,	 the	 country	 they	 had	 recently	 fled.	
Oftentimes,	 scholars	were	 reduced	 to	 interviewing	 the	 tiniest	 handful	 of	 Chinese	 refu-
gees	and	then	coming	up	with	a	grand	theory	on	the	basis	of	the	flimsiest	of	evidence.	
Few	 doubted	 that	 the	 model	 they	 were	 working	 with—studying	 contemporary	 China	
one	 step	 removed	 from	 China—was	 dubious	 at	 best,	 but	 they	 had	 no	 choice.	 There	
were,	 of	 course,	 a	 tiny	 number	 of	 Americans	 allowed	 to	 visit	 and	 travel	 in	 China—
Edgar	 Snow,	 William	 Hinton,	 and	 their	 ilk—but	 no	 serious	 scholar	 believed	 much	 of	
anything	they	said	or	wrote.
	 During	 the	 1950s,	 1960s,	 and	 1970s,	 scholars	 being	 trained	 in	 China	 studies	 did,	
however,	have	an	option	 if	 they	wanted	to	 improve	their	Chinese.	Also,	 for	those	of	us	
interested	 in	 modern	 Chinese	 history,	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 archives	 and	 scholars	 on	 the	
Mainland	did	not	necessarily	 leave	us	completely	cut	off	from	Chinese	scholars,	Chinese	
archives,	 and	 Chinese	 culture.	 There	 was	 lots	 to	 do	 in	 Taiwan,	 and	 indeed	 many	
scholars	 did	 go	 on	 to	 study	 in	 Taiwan.	 International	 political	 conditions	 changed	 from	
the	mid-1960s,	however,	and	although	many	continued	to	go	there,	Taiwan	became	less	
and	 less	attractive	as	a	place	to	study.
	 The	 1950s	 was	 an	 era	 of	 anti-Communist	 investigations	 by	 committees	 of	 the	
American	 Congress,	 and	 many	 scholars	 who	 had	 shown	 the	 least	 sympathy	 for	 the	
Communists	during	 the	war	 found	 themselves	 in	hot	water	at	 this	 time.	By	 the	1960s,	
though,	 that	 had	 all	 changed.	 The	 U.S.	 continued	 to	 embrace	martial-law	 Taiwan	 and	
Chiang	Kai-shek	 in	 spite	 of	 the	many	abuses	 committed	his	 regime	 largely	 out	 of	 fear	
for	his	giant	Communist	neighbor.	This	policy	struck	many	as	 increasingly	untenable	 in	
a	realistic	world.	But	more	 important	was	the	heightening	of	the	U.S.	war	 in	Viet	Nam.	
As	 antagonism	 toward	 the	 American	 policy	 of	 anti-Communist	 containment,	 the	
brutality	 of	 the	war,	 and	（I	 believe）	 the	 existence	 of	 a	military	 draft	which	made	 all	
young	 men	 eligible	 for	 military	 service,	 questioning	 not	 just	 the	 war	 which	 most	
academics	 were	 strongly	 opposed	 to	 by	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1960s,	 but	 the	 whole	
anti-Communist	 thrust	 of	 postwar	U.S.	 policy	 in	Asia	 led	many	 to	 vehemently	 protest	
their	 government’s	 policies	 and	doubt	 everything	 anything	 any	member	 of	 the	 various	
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administrations	responsible	 for	the	war	 in	Viet	Nam	had	to	say.
	 Although	there	was	no	hot	war	in	Taiwan,	the	center	of	the	Cold	War	in	East	Asia	
was	between	China	and	Taiwan.	Whatever	one	might	have	thought	about	contemporary	
China,	the	Communist	regime	there,	etc.,	Taiwan	became	ever	more	suspect.	Just	at	this	
time,	 a	 worldwide	 student	 movement	 was	 growing	 in	 France,	 Japan,	 Germany,	 the	
United	 States,	 and	 elsewhere,	 and	 it	 was	 enormously	 influenced	 by	 the	 simultaneous	
Cultural	 Revolution	 in	 China.	 What	 did	 students	 in	 Paris,	 Berlin,	 New	 York,	 San	
Francisco,	 and	Tokyo	all	 have	 in	 common	with	young	people	 in	Beijing	 and	Shanghai?	
They	all	had	a	copy	of	Mao zhuxi yulu	or,	as	 it	was	known	in	English,	Quotations from 
Chairman Mao	 or	 “The	 Little	 Red	 Book.”	 It	 was	 often	 quoted	 as	 much	 in	 jest	 as	 in	
seriousness	by	Americans	and	other	non-Chinese,	but	much	more	 importantly	 it	was	a	
symbol	 of	 an	 international	movement	 of	 renovation—out	with	 the	 old	 and	 in	with	 the	
new—that	 linked	all	members	 of	 the	younger	generation,	mostly	under	 thirty	years	 of	
age,	 irrespective	of	nationality.
	 Of	course,	none	of	 the	Americans	would	have	ever	visited	China.	Any	news	about	
the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 was	 filtered	 through	 the	 political	 apparatus	 attached	 to	 the	
Chinese	 news	 service.	 So,	 we	 had	 lots	 of	 glossy	 pictures	 of	 young	 people	 doing	 good	
things;	any	evidence	of	bad	things	that	managed	to	sneak	out	of	China,	usually	via	refu-
gees	 who	 escaped	 to	 Hong	 Kong,	 was	 regularly	 ignored	 and	 imputed	 to	 reactionary	
political	 views.	 Thus,	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 didn’t	 even	 have	 to	 provide	 the	 blinders	
for	the	outside	world;	we	did	 it	 to	ourselves,	screening	out	any	 information	we	did	not	
want	to	hear.
	 One	important	institutional	development	during	the	height	of	the	Viet	Nam	war	was	
the	 organization	 of	 a	 group	 of	 younger	 scholars	 and	 graduate	 students	 in	 1968	 called	
the	“Committee	of	Concerned	Asian	Scholars.”	Let	me	read	you	from	this	organization’s	
1969	statement	of	purpose	to	give	you	a	flavor	of	 it:
	 We	 first	 came	 together	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 brutal	 aggression	 of	 the	 United	
States	 in	Vietnam	and	to	the	complicity	or	silence	of	our	profession	with	regard	to	
that	 policy.	 Those	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Asian	 studies	 bear	 responsibility	 for	 the	 conse-
quences	 of	 their	 research	 and	 the	 political	 posture	 of	 their	 profession.	 We	 are	
concerned	 about	 the	 present	 unwillingness	 of	 specialists	 to	 speak	 out	 against	 the	
implications	 of	 an	 Asian	 policy	 committed	 to	 ensuring	 American	 domination	 of	
much	 of	 Asia.	 We	 reject	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 aim,	 and	 attempt	 to	 change	 this	
policy.	 We	 recognize	 that	 the	 present	 structure	 of	 the	 profession	 has	 often	
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perverted	scholarship	and	alienated	many	people	 in	the	field.
	 The	Committee	 of	Concerned	Asian	Scholars	 seeks	 to	 develop	 a	 humane	 and	
knowledgeable	 understanding	 of	 Asian	 societies	 and	 their	 efforts	 to	 maintain	
cultural	 integrity	and	 to	confront	 such	problems	as	poverty,	 oppression,	 and	 impe-
rialism.	We	realize	 that	 to	be	 students	 of	 other	peoples,	we	must	first	understand	
our	relations	to	them.
	 CCAS	wishes	 to	 create	alternatives	 to	 the	prevailing	 trends	 in	 scholarship	on	
Asia,	which	too	often	spring	from	a	parochial	cultural	perspective	and	serve	selfish	
interests	 and	 expansionism.	Our	 organization	 is	 designed	 to	 function	 as	 a	 catalyst,	
a	 communications	 network	 for	 both	 Asian	 and	 Western	 scholars,	 a	 provider	 of	
central	resources	 for	 local	chapters,	and	a	community	 for	the	development	of	anti-
imperialist	research.	（March	28-30,	1969）
	 The	 point	 was	 explicitly	 political	 to	 counteract	 what	 the	 group	 considered	 the	
unspoken	 political	 direction	 of	 academics	 in	 general	 and	 Asian	 studies	 in	 particular.	
Their	 journal,	 the	 Bulletin of Concerned Asian Studies,	 still	 comes	 out	 although	 now	
under	the	title	Critical Asian Studies,	and	 it	still	has	a	sharply	 leftist	political	bent.	My	
point	 is	 that,	 as	was	 the	case	elsewhere	 in	 the	world,	China	 studies	and	Asian	 studies	
more	 generally	 were	 becoming	 more	 and	 more	 politicized.	 And,	 because	 of	 Taiwan’s	
cozy	 place	 under	 the	 American	 nuclear	 umbrella	 and	 in	 the	 ongoing,	 American-led,	
anti-Communist	struggle,	 it	became	tainted	politically.
	 Japan	was	by	no	means	politically	pristine,	as	 it	too	fell	under	the	nuclear	umbrella	
and	was	deeply	dependent	on	the	United	States	 for	many	things	 in	the	postwar	world.	
Nonetheless,	 it	 was	 less	 tainted	 in	 the	 field	 of	 China	 studies,	 and	 because	 of	 its	 long	
traditions	of	Sinological	research,	many	scholars	 in	the	first	postwar	decades	went	there	
to	 continue	 their	 research	 on	 modern	 China	 rather	 than	 Taiwan.	 The	 first	 postwar	
generation	 included	many	men	and	women	who	had	served	 in	 the	war	or	 in	 the	occu-
pation	 of	 Japan,	 and	 in	 the	 postwar	 years	went	 into	 Chinese	 historical	 studies.	 In	 the	
1960s	 and	 1970s,	 it	 was	 their	 students	who	 followed	 them	 primarily	 to	 universities	 in	
Kyoto	and	Tokyo.	Thus,	sufficient	expertise	to	be	able	to	read	Japanese	secondary	writ-
ings	 on	 China	 was	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 anyone	 pursuing	 doctoral	 studies	 in	 the	 United	
States	 at	 this	 time.	 During	 the	 decade	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 in	 China,	 little	
research	 of	 any	 significant	 scholarly	 value	 was	 coming	 out	 of	 China,	 and	 that	 only	
forced	us	to	rely	on	Japanese	scholarship	even	more.
	 The	first	postwar	generation	 in	Japan	was	overwhelming	directed	 leftward,	partly	
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because	any	rightist	 leftovers	 from	earlier	had	been	swept	out	of	 Japanese	 institutions	
of	 higher	 learning	 after	 the	 war,	 and	 because	 of	 the	 sharp	 swing	 against	 wartime	
Japanese	 activities	 in	 Asia.	 So,	 many	 Western	 and	 particularly	 American	 students	 of	
Chinese	 history	who	went	 to	 study	 in	 Japan	 found	 likeminded	 Japanese	 of	 their	 same	
generation—if	anything,	even	more	 leftist	 than	the	Americans	 fashioned	themselves.	 In	
addition,	 the	Fulbright	Commission	 and	 the	 Japan	Foundation	 provided	 fellowships	 for	
study	 in	Japan	which	made	 it	much	easier.
	 This	 turns	 out	 in	 retrospect	 to	 have	 been	 a	 relative	 short	 honeymoon	 period	 of	
maybe	 25-30	 years.	 Since	 rise	 to	 power	 of	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 the	 launching	 of	 China’s	
massive	modernization	projects,	 and	China’s	welcoming	back	 into	 the	 family	 of	 nations	
from	 its	 comparative	 isolation	 for	 so	 long,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 understandable,	 even	
logical,	 but	 unfortunate	 byproduct.	From	 the	 1980s	 and	 then	 later	with	 the	 collapse	 of	
Communism	in	the	Eastern	Bloc	countries	 in	1989	and	1991,	graduate	students	now	can	
travel	 and	 study	 in	 China	 for	 significant	 periods	 of	 time,	 make	 use	 of	 central	 and	
regional	archives,	 interact	with	Chinese	scholars,	attend	conferences	 in	China	and	 invite	
Chinese	 scholars	 for	 periods	 of	 research	 and	 conferences	 abroad,	 and	 in	 general	 have	
access	 to	 China	 and	 the	 Chinese	 in	 a	way	 unthinkable	 just	 a	 generation	 ago.	 And,	 of	
course,	 American	 and	 other	 foreign	 scholars	 now	 flock	 to	 China	 in	 droves.	 The	
byproduct	 is	 that	 few	 now	 do	 research	 on	 China	 in	 Japan	 and	 fewer	 still	 learn	
Japanese	at	all.	This	unfortunate	development	has	been	exacerbated	by	the	push	to	get	
through	graduate	 school	 as	 quickly	 as	 humanly	 possible,	 and	 that	means	 cutting	 short	
language	training	 in	a	second	East	Asian	 language.
	 There	are,	 of	 course,	 exceptions,	 so	 I	don’t	want	 to	convey	 the	 image	 that	what	 I	
have	 just	depicted	 is	a	wholesale	phenomenon.	But,	a	 look	through	the	visiting	students	
and	 scholars	 at	most	 Tōyōshi	 departments	 in	 Japanese	 universities	 reveals	 extremely	
few	 Americans,	 Canadians,	 or	 Europeans—although,	 interestingly,	 there	 are	 numerous	
Chinese	 students	 in	 Japan.	Kansai	University	 is	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 this	 new	 and	 fasci-
nating	 development,	 and	 although	 no	 one	 knows	 where	 it	 will	 go,	 we	 can	 all	 look	
forward	to	positive	progress.
